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      Christian humanism in the III millennium from the perspective of Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy can be developed by finding the 
common area between Thomism and other current philosophy trends, for example analytic philosophy. I have made an attempt to 
show what is common and what is different in both metaphysics: Krapiec’s metaphysics and Strawson’s metaphysics. Krapiec’s 
metaphysics and Strawson’s metaphysics had the same material subject matter of metaphysics: everything that really exists. 
Nevertheless they have different formal subject matters: existence (Krapiec) and the general aspect, the scheme of concepts 
(Strawson). According to Krapiec, the method of metaphysics should be causal explanation. According to Strawson, the method of 
metaphysics should be analysis. I am going to show that elements of both methods are present in both metaphysics.  
 
 
Christian humanism in the III millennium from the perspective of Thomas 
Aquinas’s philosophy can be developed by finding the common area between 
Thomism and other current philosophy trends, for example analytic philosophy. 
The common area for both: Thomism and analytic philosophy is not a new idea1. 
According to John Haldaine (from St. Andrews University)2 now there is 
analytical Thomism, which connects the analytic traditions with Aquinas` thought 
and his followers. It tries to use the tools of analytic philosophy to investigate the 
philosophical problems of Aquinas’s philosophy. 
 
My paper presents an attempt to show what is common and what is 
                                                                 
1 One issue of “The Monist” presents the analytical Thomism (“The Monist. An 
International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry”, 1997, vol. 80, no. 4), 
the number of “New Blackfriars”, edited by English Dominicans, is named: Thomism 
and the Future of Catholic Philosophy (”New Blackfriars. A Monthly Review” 80 (1999), 
no. 938) and a lot of papers of J. Haldaine’s. Among the analytical philosophers 
Elisabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach also sympathised with the philosophy of 
Thomas. 
2 J. Haldane, Analytical Thomism: A Brief Introduction, “The Monist”, vol. 80 (1997), 
no. 4, p. 485 – 486. 
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different in both metaphysics: Mieczyslaw Albert Krapiec’s3 metaphysics and 
Peter Frederic Strawson’s4 metaphysics. 
 
Krapiec and Strawson have never discussed directly, but indirectly 
through books and articles, where there were analyses of the subject matters and 
methods of metaphysics from other trends of philosophy. 
 
In the first part of my article I want to describe the methodological tools 
which are used to present the metaphysics. In the second part I describe the 
philosophy of Krapiec and the philosophy of Strawson. The third part presents 
the possible discussion between Krapiec and Strawson about the subject matter of 
metaphysics and the method of metaphysics. Finally it includes connections 
between the two metaphysics. 
 
Part One 
It is possible to present all philosophy by describing the following topics: 
subject matter, method and aim. 
 
The subject matter of metaphysics is the one which deals with metaphysics. 
In the Thomistic tradition material subject matter and formal subject matter are 
distinguished. The material subject matter is understood as what is being studied. 
The formal subject matter is understood as a study aspect. 
 
Both metaphysics used some different methods. The most important are: 
analysis and causal explanation.  
 
The analysis concerns concepts or language. It consists in taking down 
(decomposing) concepts (or sentences) to simple parts and showing how the 
concepts (sentences) are connected. The aim of an analysis is to clarify the content 
of concepts (sentences) by identification of their simpler components. 
 
An explanation concerns the state of affairs (described in a sentence) and 
shows its causes. Therefore, it is named causal explanation, after Aristotle used by 
Aquinas. The causal explanation is described in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Supplement as follows:  
 
                                                                 
3 Mieczyslaw Albert Krapiec was born in 1921. He is a Dominican and a retired 
professor of metaphysics at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. The philosopher 
is the author of existential Thomism. He has written many books, from which a lot of 
students in Poland have learned philosophy 
4 Peter Frederic Strawson was born in 1919. He is a retired professor of metaphysics 
at Oxford University. He belongs to the analytic philosophers who are interested not 
only in language but also in metaphysics problems. 
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“For Aristotle [...] a causal explanation is one that cites one or more of four causes or 
determining factors that exist in nature and correspond to the meanings of the question 
Why?: the material cause (the matter or constituents of which something is composed); the 
formal cause (the form or structure); the efficient cause (an external source of motion or 
charge); and the final cause (the end, purpose, or function of something)” 5. 
 
It is a different explanation from that used in natural sciences.  
 
Part Two 
Krapiec is one of the most outstanding and significant figures in 
contemporary Polish philosophy. He names his philosophy existential Thomism 
and refers to classical philosophy, mainly to the philosophy of Aristotle and Saint 
Thomas Aquinas and the following contemporary philosophers: J. Maritain, E. 
Gilson. 
 
According to Krapiec contact with the real world which people first 
know through sensual perceptions (and then in mind) is always first. He cites 
Aristotle: 
 
“All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our 
senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all 
others the sense of sight”6.  
 
The real world exists not connected with a human being. The most 
important element of being is its existence, which decides whether the being real 
exists or not. He starts his philosophy with the ordinary knowledge about the 
world. Next is the thesis about pluralism in the world: the singular real existing 
beings are different. Then come the questions: “Why is something such and not 
other” namely the question about reason. As a result Krapiec defines philosophy 
as “an attempt to understand ‘why’ something is and is such, not other” and 
indicates a real factor which cannot be negated. 
 
The first philosophical domain is metaphysics, the next are: metaphysics of 
God, metaphysics of man, metaphysics of knowledge, metaphysics of morals and 
metaphysics of culture. According to Krapiec, metaphysics is knowledge of the 
basic principle of the real existing world, which is explained by causes. The goal of 
metaphysicists is to investigate: 
 
1) the first principles of being: principle of identity, principle of inconsistency, 
principle of sufficient reason; 
                                                                 
5 P. Achinstein , Explanation, in: The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Supplement, ed. M. D. 
Borchert, New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan1996, p. 168. 
6 Aristotle, Metaphysics, tr. D. Ross, 980a (b. 1, ch.1) in: 
http://classics.mit.edu/aristotle/metaphysics.html 
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2) transcendental property of being, such as: being as a thing, being as unity, 
being as individuality, being as truth, being as good, being as beauty; 
3) the structure of being; there are the following elements of being: essentia and 
existentia, matter and form, accidents and substance; there all are in the way of 
act and possibility. 
 
Peter Frederic Strawson is a widely known and influential postwar British 
philosopher. He is usually associated with the Oxford Ordinary Language 
Philosophy. He is the author of “descriptive metaphysics” which is “an attempt to 
reveal and elucidate the most general features of the conceptual structure in terms 
of which we do as a matter of fact think about the world and ourselves.”7 
 
The goal of Strawson’s metaphysics is only to describe (not revise) the 
fundamental and most general features of our conceptual scheme and indicate the 
basic and most pervasive concepts that we need to think about the world.  
 
He uses the method of connective analysis. He starts his philosophy with 
an idea that a hearer can know of which object a speaker is speaking. He wrote 
about the hearer identifying the particular and the speaker making an identifying 
reference. 
 
In Strawson’s opinion, in the ordinary non-philosophical thinking about 
the world and ourselves it is possible to distinguish a certain number of 
fundamental, general, pervasive concepts: space, time, object, event, mind, body, 
knowledge, truth, meaning, existence, identity, action, intention, causation, 
explanation. The philosophical aim is to make them clear or elucidating, with the 
stress on interconnection8 
 
In Strawson’s opinion, Aquinas was a great philosopher9.  
 
Krapiec would probably accuse Strawson’s philosophy of being concerned 
only with the scheme of concepts (it means geneaspect of reality) and does not 
take into consideration the most important aspect of reality: its existence. 
 
Strawson would almost certainly accuse Krapiec’s philosophy of making 
the revisionary metaphysics, which is going to form a better structure of thinking 
                                                                 
7 P. F. Strawson, My Philosophy, in: The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson, ed. P. K. Sen, R. 
R. Verma, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1995, p.5. 
8 P. F. Strawson, My Philosophy, p. 13-14. 
9 P. F. Strawson, What Have We learned from Philosophy in the Twentieth Century?, 
“Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy”, vol. 8: Contemporary 
Philosophy, Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State 
University 2000, s. 270. 
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about the world and ourselves than we currently have. Besides, he wants to 
explain through pointing at causes. But Strawson said that it was an impossible 
task. 
 
According to Krapiec, the subject matter of metaphysics are singular beings 
(in other words particular substance or Aristotle’s first substance). The singular 
beings he understood as what is singular, real existing. The beings can be material 
or not material. 
 
According to Strawson, the subject matter of metaphysics is the conceptual 
scheme, namely the general beings (in other words general substance or 
Aristotle’s second substance). It is not the singular beings, which Strawson names 
particulars. The particular he understood as what is spatio-temporal, individual, 
defined. But in Strawson’s opinion, metaphysics investigates our conceptual 
scheme, which means the structure of our thought about the world and search it 
for high and basic features10. It is general, not singular as particulars or beings. 
 
Krapiec does not write about conceptual scheme. But in his philosophy 
there are parts about what is general. 
 
It is important that neither of them investigated ideas or pure possibility 
like Edmund Husserl nor the third nature like Duns Scott. 
 
Strawson supposes that the method of metaphysics should be the 
connective analysis, which traces “...connections in a system without hope of 
being able to dismantle or reduce the concepts we examine to other and simpler 
concept.”11 We must “...give up the notions of what is fundamental from the 
conceptual point of view”12. 
 
But unlike other analytic philosophers, he did not suppose that all general 
features of the ordinary conceptual scheme in terms of which we think about the 
world are easily available for the method of linguistic analysis. They are not fully 
displayed by the structure of ordinary language, but rather presupposed by it. 
 
According to Krapiec, the method of metaphysics should be causal 
explanation. According to Strawson, the method of metaphysics should be 
analysis. 
 
                                                                 
10 P. F. Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1992, p. 24, 33. 
11 P. F. Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics, p. 21. 
12 Ibidem. 
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Both of them assume metaphysical and epistemological realism. 
Strawson argues for direct realism in perception but concedes that scepticism 
concerning the external world is not conclusively refutable.  
 
Part Three 
I think, it is too easy to say that both these metaphysics have two different 
subject matters and methods. 
 
I suppose that Krapiec’s metaphysics and Strawson’s metaphysics had the 
same material subject matter of metaphysics: everything that really exists. 
 
However they have different formal subjects matter. Existential Thomism 
investigated everything that really exists in the aspect of existence and asked what 
metaphysical elements of being finally explained it. These were: existence and 
essence. Strawson investigated everything that really exists in the general aspect 
of the scheme of concepts. 
 
According to Krapiec the method of metaphysics was supposed to be an 
explanation. However (I think) he used the conceptual analysis to clarify the 
concept of being.  
 
A central task of Strawson’s metaphysics is not only to describe but, in the 
best way we can, explain the fundamentals of human thought. Although 
according to Strawson the method of metaphysics was supposed to be conceptual 
analysis, finally he explained the possibility of the cognition of the world through 
the conceptual scheme. 
 
According to Krapiec, Kant’s philosophy (particularly his metaphysics) is a 
big mistake and he rejects Kant’s conclusions. However, Strawson said that he (as 
Kant) seeked the answer to questions about the most general, structured property 
of our conceptual scheme. Strawson defends claims about the necessary structure 
of our experience, which resemble those advanced by Kant. What is more, he (like 
Kant) used the method of transcendental arguments. 
 
Part Fourth 
I think the difference between Krapiec’s metaphysics and Strawson’s 
metaphysics has its source in different answers to the following questions: 
 
1) What is the role of the conceptual scheme in knowing of singular beings? 
2) Must philosophy talk about reality through investigation of language and 
conceptual scheme?  
 
But the difference is not extremely big. Both metaphysics investigates the 
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reality to say what the most general principles it has. Although such an easy 
definition is correct in both metaphysics, they are different. There is a common 
area and a separate area. I am going to suggest ten theses about a common area 
for both metaphysics: 
 
1) The existential aspect of reality is not totally absent from Strawson’s 
metaphysics. It is an interesting idea for analytical philosophy: the existential 
aspect of being and the reasons why Krapiec makes it the most important 
aspect of reality. 
2) The general aspect of reality is not absent from Krapiec’s metaphysics. The 
Thomistic tradition can reconsider the reasons for studying the general aspect 
of reality; 
3) They do not speak of two different subject matters. 
4)  It is impossible to investigate the world without a language and a conceptual 
scheme. And in Aquinas’s philosophy there is lots of studying of the concepts 
and language. For example the category of “conceptiones universales”13 – the 
most general concepts which you must use to think or speak about the world. 
But Krapiec did not speak about this category of Aquinas’s. And in De Anima 
(On the Soul) of Aristotle (which Krapiec often quoted) there is the following 
sentence: “that mind is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though 
actually it is nothing until it has thought? What it thinks must be in it just as 
characters may be said to be on a writing tablet on which as yet nothing 
actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with mind”14.  
5) The study of the conceptual scheme is better presented in the metaphysics of 
Strawson. Maybe it can be used in the metaphysics of Krapiec to make the 
process of clarifying of being as being more clear. 
6) Causal explanation and analysis are two different methods. There is a question 
whether these metaphysics have something in common when we use two 
other methods I think that is, because the both philosophers did not use the 
only method they claim they use. The elements of analysis are in Krapiec 
metaphysics and the elements of explanations are in Strawsons metaphysics15. 
I argue that the process of clarifying of being (which is the important part of 
Krapiec’s metaphysics) is not metaphysical, causal explanation, but analysis. 
In the process of clarifying of being Krapiec researches the transcendental 
property of being. I think the elements of causal explanation are in Strawson 
metaphysics too. He seeks the deeper, unified structure of our thinking about 
the world and then he cannot be only on the describing and analysing level. 
                                                                 
13 Thomas Aquinas, Questiones disputate de veritate, q.10 a. 6 co, q.11 a. 1 ad 5, in: 
http://www.unav.es/filosofia/alarcon.amicis/qdv10.html 
14 Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), 429b-430a (b.III, Ch. 4), tr. J. A. Smith, in : 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.html 
15 See for example P. F. Strawson, My Philosophy, p. 9 
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His last aim of metaphysics is the explanation of the possibility of knowing 
about the real world through the conceptual scheme. And it is not only 
analysis, but also explanation. The analysis cannot say how it is possible. It 
means that both metaphysics use both methods: analysis and causal 
explanations and it is the common level in both metaphysics. 
7) In Krapiec’s metaphysics the method of causal explanation is described more 
accurately. I think Strawson’s philosophy can discover the theory of four 
causes and use it in to philosophical explanations. 
8) It is important to say that Strawson rejects Kant’s transcendental idealism.  
9) In Aristotle’s philosophy and in Aquinas’s philosophy (which Krapiec accepts) 
there are theses about activity of human mind16. 
10) In the postmodern area for both metaphysics the following problems are 
common: truth, rationality, objectivity. 
 
 
Conclusions 
I have tried to show possible connections between Krapiec’s metaphysics 
and Strawson’s metaphysics. I aimed to show common areas for further study. It 
is only an introduction to use the results of analytic philosophy to investigate the 
thought of Aquinas. Although Krapiec and Strawson describe what metaphysics 
should be differently, it is possible to use the results of one of these metaphysics as 
a tool for doing another. 
 
Aquinas thought highly of the wisdom of Aristotle and at the end I want to 
quote Aristotle: “....it is not probable that either of these should be entirely 
mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or 
even in most respects.”17  
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